CBM Project

Ever since negotiations on an additional verification protocol in 2001 failed, the international Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) remains without a verification-mechanism for compliance by its signatories.
In the absence of a verification regime and in light of the dual-use nature of nearly all activities in modern biotechnology, transparency measures in the context of the BWC take on central importance.

Transparency towards  biological activities conducted in one's own country is a cornerstone of mutual trust-building. Excessive secrecy surrounding military and civilian activities in the biological field could lead to misinterpretations and a mutually reinforcing distrust among the contracting states.

Therefore, the contracting states of the BWC agreed to submit annual confidence-building measures (CBMs) in 1986, which encouraged them to disclose their biotechnological activities in detail to each other. At the third BWC Review Conference of  1991, the forms for CBMs were extended, yet, since then, they  have remained mostly unchanged. Therefore they are subjected to becoming outdated as technological progress continues. Furthermore the CBMs may be at risk of loosing relevance due to the continous low participation of the contracting states.

The research post for biological weapons control has closely accompanied the development of the CBMs ever since its inception. It has analyzed the data exchanged in the context of CBMs and provided recommendations on how the CBMs could be designed more purposefully by trying to decide on those information most relevant for exchange. Furthermore, the research post has continuously worked towards increased participation by the contracting states. Some of this work can be found in the annual CBMs readers published by the research center.